From Google Books Nov 5, 1783
The defence was a deed from the soldier to Edward Cumpston, dated the 5th of November, 1783. This deed conveyed all the soldier's expected bounty lands in fee to Cumpston, with a power of attorney to Jeremiah Van Rens- selaer and Abraham Ten Eyck, to convey to Cumpslon in fee, and a covenant that when a patent should issue for the soldier's lands, they (his attorneys) should convey them in fee simple to Cumpston.
The defendant then proved a deed executed by the attorneys, reciting the power, and dated the 23d of September, 1790, from the soldier to Cumpston in fee. This deed, executed by the attorneys, was deposited pursuant to the statutes before cited; but the deed constituting them attorneys, was not.
(a) This cause was decided at Jiay term, 1826.
Vol. VI. 19
The defendant claimed under the Cumpston title ; showing several intermediate conveyances of title from him to one Leffingwell, with whom Camp contracted lo purchase; and under whom the defendant, as before mentioned, claimed to have taken possession.
The judge directed the jury to find for the plaintiff, if they believed that the defendant look possession under the lessors; but if they believed that he took possession under Camp, and found the deed to Cumpston to be genuine, they should then bring in their verdict for the defendant; it not being necessary that the deed containing the power should be deposited.
Verdict for the defendant.
A case vvas made; and it was agreed, that it might be turned by either party into a special verdict; and that if this court should be of opinion that the deed to Cumpslon containing the power, was void as to the deed of June 9th, 1792, by reason of not being deposited, that then the judgment should be for the plaintiff.
But if the court should be with the plaintiff on any other ground, a new trial to be granted.
If they should be with the defendant on all the grounds, then judgment to be entered for the defendant.
J. Plait, for the plaintiff. The deed from the soldier, containing the power of attorney, not having been deposited, was void ; and all the title derived from it was inoperative as against the lessors of the plaintiff, who claimed under a subsequent deed from the soldier.
If notice only had been designed by the statute, (1 R. L. 209,) a mere registry would have been enough. The legislature had a further object. That was to detect frauds ; nnd they required the original instrument to be deposited with that view. The mischief could not be reached without this being done. Indeed the detection of frauds was the declared object of the statute.